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Abstract 
 
 
This research (1) investigates the presence of political business cycles in Latin America 
by looking at two major economic variables (money growth and budget deficits) and (2) 
studies the influence of the IMF on economic decisions made by political incumbents 
from 1976 to 1997. 
Our research answers three main questions. First, we determine the presence of political 
business cycle in a dataset of 16 Latin American countries. Second, we ask ourselves 
whether the presence of IMF credit is increasing the willingness of the politicians to use 
economic policy instruments to maneuver the economy with the purpose of being 
reelected, that is, whether there is a Moral hazard issue from the government side. The 
third point is related to the second one, but it reverts the causality: the attention now is on 
whether the proximity to the election is affecting the behavior of IMF, namely the 
decision of granting new credit.  
The analysis shows a significant presence of political business cycles on the government 
budget (but not on money growth) and a quite robust evidence of moral hazard from the 
government side, to the extent that access to credit seems to exacerbate the willingness of 
a government to distort the economic cycle for electoral reasons. For what concerns the 
behavior of the fund on election proximity, although the Fund tries to minimize the 
default’s risk by cautiously approving less new credit to countries that have already 
heavily borrowed in the past from the Fund, the credit authorized to right-wing parties 
results to be consistently higher. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 
Political business cycles (PBC) have been largely studied since the 70’s and the literature 
on this subject has grown enormously since then, adding several extensions and inducing 
a large critical debate between economists about the causes and the solutions as well. 
The question is interesting because the standard theory on the business cycle, which 
abstracts from political considerations, is often incapable of explaining the cyclical 
behavior of most economic variables. For example, Ellery, Gomes, and Sachsida (2002) 
assert that the economic cycle in Brazil is not explicable by the theory of real business 
cycle.   
So far the political business cycle literature has mostly focused on OECD countries. 
Moreover, the existing literature has never taken in consideration the role of an 
international lender like the IMF and the influence that an international organization 
could exert on the political business cycle of an indebted country.  
Compared to the current literature, the dataset that we consider includes Latin American 
countries. These countries are from severely to moderately indebted with international 
institutions. Credit availability is therefore a crucial issue for those countries and puts the 
IMF in a strong position for negotiations.  
 
Three questions will be addressed in this research.  
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First, we determine the presence of pre-electoral business cycles by looking at two 
economic variables: the government budget over GDP ratio and the money growth. This 
objective is pursued following the empirical strategy in Alesina, Roubini and Cohen 
(1997), who suggest two different regressions, one for each economic policy instruments, 
in order to investigate the relation between each variable and the pre-electoral dummy 
variable. As suggested by Alesina Roubini and Cohen (1997), the regression is done on a 
cross-country panel dataset, where (1) the dependent variable, the monetary growth is 
regressed on its lags and electoral dummy, and (2) the variation in government budget is 
regressed on the change in unemployment rate, on GDP growth, on the variation in the 
ratio of debt service over GDP and on the pre-electoral dummy variable 
 
The second part of our analysis is whether the IMF aggravates the Moral Hazard problem 
in the recipient country before an election. The policymakers in the recipient country are 
obviously interested in having a good economic performance before the elections in order 
to be reelected. What is to determine is if the presence of IMF credit is helping politicians 
seeking power or not. The empirical analysis on this topic is related to the empirical 
paper proposed by Dreher and Vaubel (2004). The fiscal policy instrument is regressed 
on its lag, on the IMF exhaustion quota during the previous period, on the new net credit 
accorded by the Fund during the previous period, on the pre-electoral dummy variable, 
and on two economic indicators, namely inflation and GDP growth for the previous 
period. 
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The third part of our work is related to the previous, but reverses the causality: the 
attention now is on whether the proximity to the election is affecting the behavior of IMF. 
In order to answer to this question, following Dreher and Vaubel (2004) we regress the 
new net credit accorded by IMF on two economic policy instruments, on the electoral 
dummies, on a series of internal economic indicators, such as namely inflation, the 
country’s net account balance, the GDP growth and the government consumption. 
Moreover, the regression takes in consideration another sets of variable as regressors, 
namely variables that show the composition of debt and the quality of the resources of the 
country. Those variables are the ratio short-term foreign debt over long-term foreign debt, 
international reserves over money supply, and the debt service. 
 
The work is organized as follows: In Section II, there will be a review of the literature on 
the subject, both on a theoretical level and on an empirical one. Section III will be 
devoted to a short description of the dataset used in the empirical analysis. In Section IV 
there will be a description of the analysis to perform, which results are going to be in 
Section V. In Section VI, conclusions will be drawn. 
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II. A review of the literature on Political Business Cycles 
 
 
Political Economy investigates the relations between the institutional structure of a given 
country (such as, the form of government and the degree of democracy and transparency) 
and economic outcomes. A particular field of interest in the political economy literature 
studies the Political Business Cycles (PBC). The literature studies the behavior of 
policymakers who may have an incentive to artificially inflate growth before election, as 
well as the behavior of electors. 
Shi and Svensson (2003) give a definition of political budget cycles, as being “a 
fluctuation” in the budget aggregate that is caused by election proximity. By extension, 
the PBC literature studies the economic cycles (that is, fluctuation in real economy 
variables, inflation or monetary variables) induced by the political cycles  
 
The first model on political cycles by Nordhaus and Hibbs (1975) is based on the strong 
hypothesis of adaptive expectations and retrospective voting. Rational expectation 
models were introduced around ten years later by different authors. This new literature on 
PBC can be divided in electoral cycle models (also called opportunistic models) and 
partisan cycles models. The difference between these two strands of literature is given by 
the motivations of politicians: in opportunistic models, politicians are office-seeking and 
their only objective is to maximize the probability of winning; in partisan models, policy-
makers care about the policies that will be implemented after the election. Inside those 
two categories that will be shortly illustrated, research comes to some common 
agreement on the direction to pursue, but not always on the ways to get there. After 
describing these two types of approach, I will review context-conditional models. 
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Opportunistic models  
 
 
Models in which policy makers are seeking re-election for themselves, no matter what it 
takes in term of policy, are called electoral or opportunistic.  
 
The most relevant ones are the models of Rogoff (1990), Rogoff, Sibert (1989) and 
Persson, Tabellini (1990), all of them having different approaches. All those models are 
hypothesizing rational expectations. In Persson Tabellini (1990), the information about 
the politicians’ competence is imperfect and electors are rational. Electors appreciate 
price stability and output growth and vote for the most competent candidate. 
 
The policymaker has an interest in obtaining a good economic performance to signal her 
competence as policymaker. The measure of competence is persistent, which means that 
policymakers have an incentive to manipulate the economy before elections to signal 
their competence after the election (in fact only competence after the election matters if 
voting is prospective). The incumbents therefore take advantage of a short-term Phillips 
curve to attain a better economic performance. In every period electors know the measure 
of competence of the past period, but they cannot infer the one of the current year, since 
inflation is known only with one period of delay.  
 
This model gives rise to both pooling equilibria (in which it is not possible for electors to 
discriminate between level of competence) and separating equilibria, in which 
policymakers with different competence choose different strategies. The way to signal 
high level of competence is to achieve a level of economic growth that could not be 
attained by an incompetent policy-maker. This implies choosing a higher than optimal 
level of inflation. The result is that if the incumbent is a competent policymaker, there 
will be a political business cycle, but not otherwise.  
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The model of Rogoff and Sibert (1989) and Rogoff (1990) the competence is captured by 
a persistent measure of efficiency in the production of public goods. Policymakers have 
therefore an incentive of signaling competence in order to be reelected by increasing the 
provision of public good. The intuition for this result is the following. Only a competent 
policy-maker is willing to worsen the budget situation with the notion that only someone 
who is very competent would put himself in that situation. Compared to a competent 
politician, an incompetent policy-maker who worsens the budget has to rely on 
distortionary taxation to balance the budget after the election. Assuming that aggregate 
welfare enters the objective of both types of politicians, an incompetent candidate does 
not mimic what the competent does. 
 
In Rogoff and Sibert (1989), government spending is financed by seignorage, which is 
distortionary, or by less-visible debt. Every policymaker with the exception of the most 
incompetent chooses to boost pre-electoral budget spending using seignorage. The good 
pre-electoral economic performance is a signal of competence that cannot be evaluated 
directly, but only inferred from present economic situation. 
 
In those models it always exists an equilibrium in which we can separate competent and 
incompetent policymakers (separating equilibrium), even though it is not possible to rule 
out a pooling equilibrium, that is, an equilibrium where all types act in the same way, 
with no possibility of discerning competence. It is clear that this model provides 
indeterminate solutions, if no further assumptions are made. 
In a second specification, Rogoff (1990) adds some more refinement to the government 
budget constrains, discriminating between government spending, more visible to the 
public, and “government investments”, less visible. Under election, competent 
policymakers have the incentive or reallocating resources from less visible investment to 
highly visible spending. The cycle appears only in some monetary and fiscal policies, 
more than real outcomes. 
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Drazen (2001) reviews the literature on PBC and argues that the “driving force” of the 
cycle does not have to be found out in the monetary policy, as in the model by Persson 
and Tabellini, rather in the fiscal policy. This is why in this research we mostly focus on 
fiscal variables. 
  
8
 
Partisan models 
 
In partisan models, policymakers differ according to their preferences. The model of 
Alesina (1997) pioneered the rational expectations in a partisan model. The starting 
assumption is that political parties have economic priorities that are set on an ideological 
basis. Left parties focus more on growth and unemployment, while partially disregarding 
effects on inflation. Right parties, on the other side, are more aware of the level of prices 
than unemployment. Each party fixes a desired level of inflation, πi, with i = L, R. 
 
The asymmetry implied in the model is summarized by the condition πL≥ πR ≥0, that is, 
the objective level of inflation of the right party is lower that the left one. Consequently, 
the expected inflation before election will be a weighted average of πL and πR, with the 
respective probability of victory at election as weights. 
 
Voters therefore will proceed to wage setting with an expected inflation that is 
systematically too high or too low compared with the ex-post actual level. 
This discrepancy results in an “artificial” cycle: in the case of a left party elected, actual 
inflation will be higher than expected. The positive unexpected shock of inflation will 
increase the demand for labor and decrease unemployment. The following period, 
however, expectations will adjust and rate of growth of production will remain constant.  
 
In case of a right party elected, on the other hand, there will be a level of inflation lower 
than expectations. This will induce a one-period reduction in the demand for labor (more 
expensive) and therefore an increase in the unemployment rate. 
 
The theory of partisan cycle will therefore predict an economic expansion (accompanied 
by higher than expected inflation), during the year following the election of a left party 
and an economy growing less than its natural rate (accompanied by inflation lower than 
expectations) the year after the elections of a right party. 
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After checking for the presence of political budget cycles, next step is to test whether the 
IMF is having an interest in lending more money to countries that are already indebted 
with international lenders, and more specifically, whether this interest actually pairs with 
an increase in the quantity of money lent in proximity of electionary periods. 
 
Bearing this in mind the partisan-cycles relevant variables will be an insightful addition 
to control. However, as Kraemer (1997) noted in his paper “Electoral budget cycles in 
Latin America and the Caribbean: incidence, causes and political futility”, Latin 
American governments are in practice less ideologically defined, compared with OECD 
countries, and that it is realistic to expect more volatility in the partisan structure. 
 
Moreover, Shi and Svensson (2003) remark that up to now, no paper that seeks for 
evidence of PBC in developing countries uses partisan cycles. In fact, even if those kind 
of model result to be successful in OECD countries, “the [partisan] distinction frequently 
does not exhibit the typical Western left-right pattern”. For this reason partisan 
considerations will be dealt more as a factor to control for, rather than a pattern for PBC. 
In the next subsection I will introduce another set of models on political budget cycles, 
the context conditional models. 
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Context-conditional models  
 
 
The first electoral models do not pay enough attention to the context. As a result, recent 
literature on PBC has introduced new dimensions of analysis, such as: 
 
- Degree of openness of the economy to an international contest 
- Economic policy conjuncture and restrains (fixed exchange rate…) 
- Form of government and structure of power organization 
- Repeated game strategy problems (election will be held again..) 
 
The above features have been singularly taken in account by countless articles. The 
context-conditional literature is a heterogeneous collection of models that explores 
election influence in a more complex way. 
The environment conditions become relevant part of the interaction between the players 
in the model. Incumbents’ autonomy of decision on matter of political economy might be 
constrained by the context in which the economy is operating. 
The review on this literature will focus on papers that somehow will give some insight on 
the question posed, both for what concerns the methodology and the choice of variables. 
 
Bernard and Leblang (1999) argue that the constraint of fixed exchange rate would make 
incumbent lose their ability of controlling monetary policy and, consequently, signaling 
their competence by engineering political budget cycles They argue also that a 
policymaker will voluntarily commit to a fixed exchange rate regime only under 
particular conditions in the domestic electoral and legislative institutions. Furthermore, 
they state that policymaker could make the currency float before the election, fixing it 
after the election. Their results show that the electoral cycle variable is not significant in 
the determination of deciding whether accept fixed exchange rate or not. 
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Only if the cost of an eventual electoral defeat is not too high and the election timing can 
be “adjusted” endogenously, policymakers will agree to lose the possibility of 
manipulating monetary policy and accept fixed exchange rate. 
  
Clark and Hallemberg (2000) seek to identify “how the interaction of the international 
environment with the domestic political institutions constrains a government’s ability to 
engineer pre-electoral macroeconomic expansion”. They apply the logic of the Mundell-
Fleming model by hypothesizing that under fixed exchange rate the governments still 
have the possibility of signaling competence before elections by using the fiscal policy 
channel. Pre-electoral budget expansion is the theoretical result, when exchanged rate are 
fixed.  
 
The study of Brender and Drazen (2004) aims at verifying if there is any connection 
between the youth of a democracy and political budget cycles. The empirical evidence 
that they collect suggests that newer democracies suffer of political budget cycles more 
than older ones. 
I will introduce a brief ensemble of facts on the International Monetary fund that are 
necessary to fully understand the analysis. 
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The IMF1 
 
Traditionally, the IMF has been seen as the “lender of last resort”, for countries with 
strong macroeconomic imbalances (high inflation, instable exchange rate, recession,  
high debt,  or all of them together ). 
 The Articles of Agreement set the legal foundation for the action, as well as the mission 
of the Fund, that is to promote stability of the exchange rate system, of the balance of 
payments, to assist countries in the implementation of new systems of payments, to 
promote growth in international trade. 
The IMF is lending money to member countries under several programs, specifically 
designed for the particular circumstances faced by the member countries, for instance, the 
poverty reduction facility or the many geography-related ones. The primary lending 
program for IMF is the Stand-By Facility, a short-term non-concessional loan designed to 
solve liquidity problems. Other non-concessional loans are the Extended Fund Facilities, 
which are usually covering a three years period and are designed to implement structural 
programs of reform. 
 
The process starts when the government of the country that wants to enter in an IMF 
program signs a “letter of intent” addressed to the IMF Executive Board. This is a 
document where there are stated the guidelines on the economic policy that the 
policymakers are willing to undergo.  
This letter in itself is not legally binding for the requesting country, nevertheless 
policymakers have a strong incentive not to loose their credibility in committing 
themselves to unrealistic constraints. The letter can be as well the result of preliminary 
informal discussion with the IMF staff. 
 
                                                 
1 This paragraph relies on the information available on the IMF website www.imf.org , unless otherwise 
stated. 
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The sense of this document is basically to agree on the economic path to follow in order 
to pursue an economic balance.  The letter of intent has to be evaluated and approved by 
the Executive board. The disbursement of money doesn’t necessarily take place in only 
one stand, but it can be granted in several parts, especially the  Extended Fund Facilities, 
due to the length of the program. The disbursement of the loan has to be accompanied by 
a control system, to prevent diversion of the resources allocated to specific projects.  
 
In order to prevent misuse of the loans, a process of periodical evaluation of the 
Country’s behavior is put in place. Here, the IMF estimates the capacity of the country to 
fulfill its commitments and monitors the progresses accomplished by the government. 
On this matter, the fourth Article of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund gives 
the legal and operational framework for the activity of surveillance. Each member 
country has to periodically provide to the Fund the necessary information to allow the 
accurate examination of the economic and structural situation of the country. 
 
According to Article IV consultations usually take place once a year, no matter if the 
member country is having a pending situation with the fund or not. 
On the base of the Consultations, the Executive Board decides on the concession of the 
following part of the loan. 
Unfortunately the work of the Fund is highly sophisticated and delicate for the very 
nature of the actors involved and the interests they are bearing. The order of problems 
encountered in the process is quite vast and articulated: 
 
• Non-compliance 
• Bias in accession 
• Trade-off conditionality-ownership 
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The periodic evaluation performed by IMF on recipient countries in order to assess the 
fulfillment of the requirement demanded by the international community (compliance) 
reserves often sour surprises: the number of countries that do not comply is high and the 
percentage of success of Fund’s program is quite low. Joyce (2003) reviews several 
authors that approached the subject. 
For what concern accession, the process of money-lending is not all the time as 
transparent, nor as successful as we wish to think and there is a relevant part of the 
decision on whether giving credit or not to a country that is highly discretionary. 
On this matter, Joyce cites Thacker (1999) and Barro and Lee (2003) that found evidence 
that access to IMF program is biased towards countries whose vote is aligned with the 
one of United States, in United Nations voting procedures. 
 
The study of Dreher and Vaubel (2004) arrives as well to quite important conclusions: 
they perform a ‘cross-country’ analysis on the effects of FMI and World Bank on 
political budget cycles. The empirical analysis suggests that there is a greater quantity of 
loans disbursed before elections.  
 
Searching for the influence of IMF on the political business cycles, it is crucial to find a 
rational motivation for the Monetary Fund to affect somehow a country’s electoral 
equilibrium. 
Vaubel (1986) introduces an interesting explanation, based on public choice theory. He 
suggests that IMF bureaucrats, like politicians, are interested in pursuing personal 
objectives, which are not necessarily shared by the establishment or by the voters. 
Moreover, Dreher (1993) cites Vaubel (1991), reaching the conclusion that there is an 
interest of IMF bureaucrats to increase the amount of money borrowed to a recipient 
country, because their position of prestige inside the structure “rises with the amount of 
money lent and the stringency of the conditionality”. A motivation of this kind would 
explain an eventual increase of money lent in election period: Personal objectives would 
enter in the process of decision of lending money to member countries, affecting the 
process. The IMF would therefore have the chance to expand its basin of credit over the 
physiological necessities of the country. 
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Conditionality 
 
A relevant characteristic of an international institution’s loan is the presence of 
conditionality. As stated in the IMF paper “Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs. 
Policy Issues” (2001), conditionality is “the linkage of financing to the implementation of 
economic policies”, that is the introduction of economic policy terms for the recipient 
countries. The country can access to the full amount of loan granted, provided that some 
conditions on economic policies previously agreed are implemented. The conditions 
touch usually macroeconomic performance indicators, however they can as well imply 
more structural reforms, as for example reforms in the banking system or the adoption of 
a currency board. 
The main purpose for conditionality is to ensure that the resources are actually used for 
the reason why they have been requested and not directed elsewhere. 
The same system of conditionality is put under accusation: The need of redesigning the 
extent and the finality, especially for structural clauses, is felt from the inside of the Fund 
as well as the outside: A paper prepared by the Fund in 2001 expresses the perplexities on 
the effectiveness and the necessity of conditionality. Moreover Drazen (2002) arrives to 
the conclusion that conditionality plays a role only in the absence of political agreements 
over objectives in the recipient country. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that the number of conditionality clauses has been 
increasing over time, especially after the 1997 Asian Crisis. On the subject, the 
International Financial Institution Advisory Commission, chaired by Meltzer submitted in 
1999 to the US cabinet a report to highlight present problems and suggest future 
guidelines to the redefinition of international monetary institutions. 
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III. Data2 
 
 
The countries that were taken in consideration are 16, all from the Latin America area. 
The World Bank defines ten of them as “severely indebted countries”. 
Those are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Nicaragua, Peru. Cuba was taken out of the sample, because no data were available to the 
public from the World Bank source. 
The World Bank defines six more countries of the dataset as “moderately indebted”. 
Those are: Belize, Chile, Colombia, Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela.  
St.Vincent et Grenadine and Dominica were taken out of the sample because there was 
no information available on their electoral history. Being the electoral variable a critic 
concept of the study, the inclusion of it could corrupt the outcome of the empirical work.  
The period that was taken in consideration goes from the 1975 to 1997. All the data are 
annual, and they are not deseasonalized. Here is a description of the series used: 
 
The study is highly based on the use of electoral and partisan dummy variables. 
The countries included in the dataset, however, have not always experienced democracy 
in the period of reference, therefore election, post-election and partisan dummy variables 
record a “not available” value during period of dictatorship. Moreover, in the panel 
regression, not available value will not enter in the regression and will not be taken in 
account. Panel dataset will be therefore unbalanced. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 In this section I refer several times to one of my most important data source: International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (2000) “World Development Indicators,CD-ROM.” Washington, 
DC. For simplicity I will refer to the source as “World Bank”. 
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Overall budget deficit, including grants (% of GDP)  -BD 
Total expenditure and lending (minus repayments), less current and capital revenue and 
official grants received. Data are shown for central government only. World Bank 
definition. 
I changed the sign of the series, in order to have some coherence in the terminology. A 
budget deficit is going therefore to have a positive sign, and a surplus a negative one 
 
Utilization of IMF quota.  -UQ 
The exhaustion of the IMF quota is seen as the total liabilities of the countries, as a 
percentage of the IMF quota. IMF Definitions. The variable capture the dimension of the 
total debt of a country toward the IMF. Recall that every country has to deposit a certain 
amount of money in the Fund. This amount is predetermined and is called quota. Every 
country has the right under normal agreement to a credit line up to 200% of the quota. 
However this limit does not include special  project financed by the Fund, which are 
associated with development finalities. 
 
Net change in IMF credit  -NNC 
“The IMF credit denotes repurchase obligations to the IMF for all uses of IMF resources 
(excluding those resulting from drawings on the reserve tranche). These obligations, 
shown for the end of the year specified, comprise purchases outstanding under the credit 
tranches, including enlarged access resources, and all special facilities (the buffer stock, 
compensatory financing, extended fund, and oil facilities), trust fund loans, and 
operations under the structural adjustment and enhanced structural adjustment facilities. 
Data are in current U.S. dollars” The variable is constructed as the first difference of the 
IMF credit series. World Bank definition 
 
GDP  % growth  at market prices  -GR 
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“GDP measures the total output of goods and services for final use occurring within the 
domestic territory of a given country, regardless of the allocation to domestic and foreign 
claims. Gross domestic product at purchaser values (market prices) is the sum of gross 
value added by all resident and nonresident producers in the economy plus any taxes and 
minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without 
making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation 
of natural resources. Data are in constant local currency” Note that this variable is in real 
terms and the fact that is calculated at “market prices” refers to the fact that the prices 
used are the prices at which final sales are made on a base year. World Bank definition. 
Inflation  -INF 
“Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change 
in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a fixed basket of goods and services.” 
World Bank definition. 
 
Monetary growth  -MON 
“Average annual growth rate in money and quasi money. Money and quasi money 
comprise the sum of currency outside banks, demand deposits other than those of the 
central government, and the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident 
sectors other than the central government. The change in the money supply is measured 
as the difference in end-of-year totals relative to the level of M2 in the preceding year.”  
The variable is capturing the nominal change in the M2 aggregate. World Bank definition. 
 
Pre-election Dummy  -ELE 
A great part of the literature on business cycles relies on the availability of annual data on 
election. This can create quite an obvious problem of “roughness” and imprecision in the 
electoral dummy variable created by those data.  
In fact, an election held in February will have a different impact on the current period 
than an election held in November: in this last one, the pre-electionary effect is going to 
be more powerful. 
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Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh (2001) 
created The Database of political institutions. The month of elections, both executives 
and legislatives was marked, allowing a more precise specification of the electoral 
dummy variable: the construction was quite linear: The ratio of the 12 months before the 
elections that was falling in each period was used, and if a country was having both 
presidential elections and legislative election an equal weight was given. 
 
The use of 12 months length for the political cycle has been preferred , as suggested by 
Franzese (2002b), rather than an 18 months length, as used by Dreher and Vaubel (2004) 
because a longer cycle implicitly calls for a more regular electoral pattern, which is a 
strong assumption for the dataset used.  
Post-election Dummy  -POSTELE 
Starting from the dummy variable ELE, which capture the fraction of the year falling 
before the elections, it is possible to construct in the same way another dummy variable 
that captures the fraction of the solar year that falls after the election event. It is necessary 
to control for cycles in the fraction of the period that falls after an election. 
 
Partisan Dummy –PARTISAN 
The dummy variable PARTISAN is set to be equal to 1 when the party in power is 
considered to be right-handed, and zero otherwise. It is used to control for partisan 
differences in the allocation of resources. 
 
Total debt service  % GDP  -SE 
Total debt service is the sum of principal repayments and interest actually paid in foreign 
currency, goods, or services on long-term debt, interest paid on short-term debt, and 
repayments (repurchases and charges) to the IMF, as a percentage of GDP. Data are in 
current U.S. dollars. World Bank Definition. 
 
Share of foreign short-term debt in total foreign debt.  -FD 
Short-term debt includes all debt having an original maturity of one year or less and 
interest in arrears on long-term debt. World Bank Definition  
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Current Account Balance as a percent of GDP  -AB 
Current account balance is the sum of net exports of goods and services, income, and 
current transfers. World Bank Definition 
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IV. Theoretical Analysis 
 
 
In order to verify the presence of budget political cycles in countries severely to 
moderately indebted and to test for an eventual effect of the IMF on the political Budget 
cycle, I will focus on three questions that are highly related to each other: 
 
Testing the presence of Political Business Cycles 
 
The first objective of my analysis will be to test for the presence of PBC in the dataset. 
 In his review of the literature on PBC, Drazen (2000) highlights the academic consensus 
on the fact that political cycles are to occur in monetary and fiscal policy instruments, 
rather than in real economic outputs. 
In particular, he argues that the “driving force” of PBC should be seen in the fiscal 
policy. Along the same lines, Shi and Svensson (2003) emphasize that the government’s 
surplus (or deficit) seems to be more influenced than monetary policy variable by 
political activities. 
In my analysis I test for the presence of Political Business Cycles both in the monetary 
instrument, namely the money growth, and in the fiscal instrument, namely budget 
deficit. In order to do this, the literature suggests to run panel regressions of time-series, 
cross-section data. 
The regression on monetary instruments for every single country will then look like this: 
 
0 1 1 2 2 1...it it it n it n n it itmon mon mon mon ELEβ β β β β ε− − − += + + + + + + , 
 
where ELE is the electoral dummy and mon the monetary growth and its lags. 
In the empirical part I will add inflation as an ulterior control variable. 
The purpose is to test if the coefficient for the election dummy variable is significative 
and eventually, what is its sign. 
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For what concerns the test on fiscal policy, I run the following Ordinary Least Squares 
panel regressions: 
 
0 1 1 2 3 4 1 5 6d d d( )it it it it it t it it itbd bd U gr b r gr ELE PARTISAN vδ δ δ δ δ δ δ− −= + + + + − + + + ,  
 
where bd is the annual deficit over GDP, dU is the change in the rate of unemployment, 
ELE the pre-electoral weighted dummy variable and PARTISAN the dummy variable that 
signals the government political orientation. 
The variable d(rt-grt) is the change in real interest rate minus the output growth rate, then 
multiplied by the debt over GDP ratio. This variable is catching the effect of variation of 
debt servicing cost after acknowledging for the “natural” increase of this variable due to 
economic growth. 
The reason for including such a variable is explained by Alesina Roubini and Cohen 
(1997): in the 70’s, after the first oil crisis, indebted countries experienced a substantial 
increase in the amount of interests paid on their debt, dynamic that must be taken in 
account when analyzing budget deficits. Unfortunately it was not possible for the dataset 
of interest to construct a coherent variable based on interest rate values. There was in fact 
no common financial measure between the countries composing the dataset. 
This is quite easily understandable: Not all the countries of the dataset had already a 
complex financial system and there was no standardization of measures. For this reason I 
decided to use as a measure of the change in debt costs, the difference in the World Bank 
measure of total debt service as a percentage of GDP. 
 In this regression, the purpose of the analysis is to test whether the coefficient for the  
election dummy variable or the partisan dummy variable coefficient are significant, and 
the sign of the relation.  
Note that in this model election dates, unemployment and interest rates are considered as 
exogenous in this model. The choice of OLS is therefore motivated by its efficiency, 
since the regression does not give problems of endogeneity. 
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The moral hazard problem 
 
The second issue to explore is whether or not IMF somewhat aggravates the government 
moral hazard problem, In other words, we check whether credit availability in the 
occurrence of economic crises distorts the behavior of policymaker: and their decision to 
accumulate debt. In fact, IMF liabilities might be perceived as “an insurance against 
adverse shocks” (Dreher and Vaubel, 2004). This would ultimately lead policymakers to 
accept higher risks. Even if this is not the object of the present analysis, it highlights the 
implicit dangers that credit availability may induce. In particular, it suggest that under the 
election, credit availability may induce by affecting the evaluation of risk from borrowing 
extra resources.  
In order to test whether IMF loans are actually induces moral hazard, I run the following 
panel regression for the fiscal policy instrument. 
 
0 1 1 2 1 3 4 5 6 1 7 1infit it it it it it it it itbd bd uq NNC ELE POSTELE grβ β β β β β β β ε− − − −= + + + + + + + + , 
 
where the dependent variable is the budget deficit as a percentage of GDP, UQ is the 
utilization quota of IMF loans, NNC is the IMF new net non concessional credit , ELE is 
the pre-electoral dummy variable,  INF is the inflation rate and GR is the output growth 
rate. 
The hypothesis to be tested in this case is the significance of the coefficients of the 
variables UQ and NNC, that is to test whether availability of credit and previous 
cumulative agreement for credit with IMF do influence government spending. 
In this case, a problem of endogeneity arises: the quantity of new net non-conditional 
debt could in fact depend on the present and past values of budget deficits, as the 
country’s economic performance is one of the parameters evaluated by the Fund in the 
concession of loans.The most appropriate estimator to use according to Shi and Svensson 
(2003) is the Arellano-Bond generalized method of moments methodology, that takes 
into account the endogeneity problem in a dynamic panel data. 
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Does election proximity matter in IMF behavior? 
 
After testing for Moral Hazard, the next step is to look at the question on the other side. 
That is, does the election’s proximity modify the behavior of IMF on lending matters? 
The question is almost specular to the one posed in the previous section on the moral 
hazard problem.: On the IMF side, in fact, the proximity to elections in the recipient 
country could induce the Fund to agree on loan concessions beyond real needs of the 
recipient country, exploiting the increased demand due to election proximity.  
 
The regression suggested by Dreher and Vaubel (2004) consists in using the new net 
credit that a country has received from IMF during the year as the dependent variable and 
regressing it on a set of variables that represent the “instruments” in the hands of policy 
makers: monetary growth, budget deficit as before and government consumption as a % 
of GDP. The regression to be tested is the following: 
 
0 1 1 2 3 4
5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 1 10 1
it it it it it
it it it it it it it
NNC NNC ELE POSTELE PARTISAN
UQ inf gr FD AB SE
β β β β β
β β β β β β ε
−
− − − − − −
= + + + + +
+ + + + + + +  
 
 where the dependent variable is the IMF new net non concessional credit , ELE is the 
pre-electoral dummy variable, POSTELE is is the post-electoral dummy variable, 
PARTISAN is the dummy variable that signals the government political orientation, UQ 
is the utilization quota of IMF loans, inf is the inflation rate, gr is the output growth rate, 
FD is the foreign short-term debt over total foreign debt, current account balance as a 
percent of GDP, while SE is the total debt service as a percentage of GDP. 
As before, our methodology uses the Arellano Bond estimator, which will be further 
described in the empirical analysis. 
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V. Empirical analysis 
 
Test for political Business Cycles  
In this section I will run the tests for Political Business Cycles both for the monetary and 
for the fiscal policy instrument 
From the initial form of regression suggested by Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997), the 
lags of monetary growth bigger than two were not significant. Furthermore, checking for 
fixed effects in the sample turned out to have some surprisingly marked differences 
across countries. In Table 1 I omitted the values of each country’ specific coefficient. 
The first value is the coefficient, the value in parenthesis is the standard deviation , the 
values in squared parenthesis are the 95% confidence interval. 
Coefficients that are significant at the 10% significant level are marked with a star* next 
the standard deviation, while coefficients that are significant at the 5% significant level 
are marked with a double star**. 
 
Table 1: Growth monetary base (Original Version) 
Explanatory variables Pooled Least squares results 
0.19 
(0.05)** 
Monetary growth (t-1) [0.08  0.30] 
0.20 
(0.06)** 
Monetary growth (t-2) [0.09   0.31] 
257.18 
(176.08) 
Elections [-94.98 609.35] 
Fixed effect Yes 
R-squared 0.20 
Adjusted R-squared 0.15 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.04 
 F-statistic 38.28 
 Prob(F-statistic) 0 
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The regression of monetary growth on its lag has a very poor result. The R squared is 
low, but still acceptable. The coefficients on the two lags of monetary growth are 
significant and positive. This means that there is some persistency in the series. The 
coefficient of the election dummy variable ELE is not significant, suggesting that 
political business cycles do not manifest themselves through money growth. 
However, the regression’s R squared is low, which could indicate a problem of 
misspecification, and more in detail, a problem of omitted variables. It is therefore too 
early to assess to absence of Political business cycles in the monetary instrument. I will 
introduce inflation as a control variable for the regression 
 
Table 2 shows a second regression, performed starting from the original theoretical 
formula. Inflation is added to the explanatory variables. This assumption is quite 
reasonable, since the database is made of highly and moderately indebted countries, and 
that several between them experienced episodes of high or very high inflation (i.e. Brazil, 
Argentina, Bolivia). 
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Table 2: Growth monetary base (Revised Version) 
Explanatory variables Pooled Least squares results 
-0.12 
(0.02)** Monetary growth (t-1) 
[ -0.16  -0.08 ] 
0.06 
(0.02)** Monetary growth (t-2) 
[0.02  0.1] 
-60.10 
(66.03) Elections 
[-192.18  71.97] 
0.86 
(0.02)** Inflation 
[0.83  0.90] 
Fixed effect Yes 
R-squared  0.91 
Adjusted R-squared 0.90 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.43 
F-statistic 938.34 
Prob (F-statistic) 0 
 
In this regression, the pre-electoral dummy is still not significant, however the regression 
appears more reasonable for this dataset than the version suggested by Alesina, Roubini, 
Cohen, at least for what concerns the R squared which has significantly risen 
 
In the test for Political Business Cycles in the fiscal policy, the fixed country effect was 
not significant; therefore the final model proposed in Table 3 is showing a common 
intercept. 
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Table 3: Deficit over GDP 
Explanatory variables Pooled Least squares results 
-0.06    
(0.10) bd (t-1) 
[ -0.26    0.15] 
-0.01 
(0.24) du     
[ -0.49    0.47] 
0.01 
(0.10) gr      
[-0.19    0.21] 
-4.62E-11 
(  1.05e-10) dse     
[ -2.55e-10    1.62e-10] 
2.34 
(1.30)* ele     
[-0.23    4.92] 
2.21 
(0.87)** cons   
[ 0.48    3.94] 
F test that all u_i=0:   F(11, 111)=4.94   Prob > F = 0.0000 
sigma_u   5.48   
sigma_e   4.20   
rho    0.63   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
 
 
 
None of the coefficient is significant: nor the change in the rate of unemployment, nor the 
coefficient of the output growth, nor the proportion of debt service over GDP.  
The pre-electoral dummy is significant at a 10% level of confidence, and positive. This 
means that an increase of the part of the pre-electoral year in a given period is going to 
increase the budget deficit of (2.34/12) % for each month, compared to a non-electionary 
period. This is the confirmation that some sort of political business cycle is showing in 
the fiscal policy variable. It is important to stress that the coefficient is robust to quite a 
series of specification. 
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The F test suggest that in this case a fixed effect estimation is correct. 
The autocorrelation matrix does not show any serious pattern of serial correlation of the 
residuals. 
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Government Moral Hazard and the endogeneity problem 
 
 
The tests for the moral hazard are a little more cumbersome in the application. 
I will first of all give more information on the variables of interest, and then discuss about 
the potential implication of variables’ interactions. 
The interpretation Dreher and Vaubel (2002) give about the new net non-concessional 
credit variable insists on the discretion of the quantity of credit received by IMF: once the 
country quota in the Fund is established (and a maximum amount of credit receivable 
too) the credit is negotiated for roughly a three to five years frame (see Annex). However, 
as I already mentioned, the payment of the different parts of the loan is conditional to the 
accomplishment of some predetermined objectives. It is clear that the quantity of new, 
net IMF credit toward governments might be affected by values of early deficit, i.e. a non 
virtuous government budget in period t-1 might have an influence in the credit decisions 
in t. On the other side, the budget could be swayed most reasonably by the quantity of 
credit obtained in the previous years by the Fund. 
 There is a problem of endogeneity that affects the potential results of an OLS analysis: in 
case of endogeneity, in fact OLS fixed effects methodology produces an estimator that is 
biased and inconsistent: this problem needs to be taken into account. 
 
 The Arellano-Bond GMM estimator uses as the dependent variable the first difference of 
the variable of interest and uses as instruments for the independent endogenous variables 
the first difference and the lagged levels of the variable. 
The gain from using the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator rather than an instrumental 
variable one is the better exploitation of the information, which leads to a greater 
efficiency. 
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The Arellano- Bond estimator can be performed in one or two steps; the difference is that 
the two steps procedure optimizes the covariance matrix estimated in the first step and 
improves the efficiency of the estimator. However, Arellano and Bond (1991) note that 
even if the asymptotic standard errors are significantly lower in the two-steps procedure, 
the gain in efficiency may indicate a finite sample downward bias, the same that they 
found in their empirical work. Empirically, Van Reenen (2006) suggests that the best 
empirical approach is to estimate the regression with a one-step regression, and the White 
correction for heteroskedasticity. 
The Arellano-Bond estimator relies heavily on the hypothesis of non-correlation of 
second order of the regression errors, while the autocorrelation of order one should be 
significant.  For this purpose the Arellano-Bond test of autocorrelation of first and second 
order are performed. The Table shows two columns: number (1) is the Pooled regression-
fixed effect estimation, while number (2) is the Arellano- Bond gmm estimation. 
 
The specification differs slightly from the regression suggested by Dreher and Vaubel 
(2002), only because some variables were dropped as not significant.The dependent 
variable is the budget deficit as a percentage of GDP; as independent variables there are 
the utilization quota of IMF loans, UQ; and NNC, the IMF new net non-concessional 
credit as variables to control for moral hazard; then ELE is the pre-electoral dummy 
variable, POSTELE the post-electoral one and PARTISAN the dummy variable that takes 
in account for the ideological position of the government. INF is the inflation rate and GR 
is the output growth rate. 
 
The first value is the coefficient, the value in parenthesis is the standard deviation , the 
values in squared parenthesis are the 95% confidence interval. 
Coefficients that are significant at the 10% significant level are marked with a star* next 
the standard deviation, while coefficients that are significant at the 5% significant level 
are marked with a double star** 
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Table 4. Government budget deficit :Moral Hazard 
Explanatory variables (1) Fixed effects (2)Gmm 
0.43 0.25 
(0.08)** (0.12)** Budget deficit (t-1) 
[ 0.28    0.59] [0.03    0.48] 
0.004 0.008 
( 0.005)  (0.004)** Utilization Quota 
[ -0.0056    0.014] [0.00014     0.016] 
-4.56E-11 -1.17E-09 
(8.74e-10 ) (6.95e-10)* New Net Credit (t-1) 
[  -1.77e-09    1.68e-09] [-2.53e-09    1.96e-10]
-0.0004 -0.003 
(0.0003 ) (0.002 )* Inflation (t-1) 
[  -0.0009    0.0002] [-0.0072    0.0008] 
-1.17E-10 -1.16E-10 
( 1.14e-10 )  (5.59e-11)** Debt service (t-1) 
[ -3.42e-10    1.07e-10] [ -2.26e-10   -6.79e-12]
2.66 3.39 
( 1.03 )** (1.46)** Elections     
[0.63    4.69] [0.52    6.25] 
-0.62 -0.092127 
(1.07) ( 1.11 ) Post Elections   
[ -2.74     1.50] [-2.27    2.086] 
-1.87 -3.42 
(0.86)** (1.62 )** 
Partisan 
(right=1)    
[ -3.58    -0.17] [ -6.61   -0.24] 
1.84 0.14 
( 0.83 )** (0.14)   constant 
[ 0.21    3.47] [  -0.15   0.42] 
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0:  
H0: no autocorrelation   z =  -2.33 Pr > z = 0.02  
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0:  
H0: no autocorrelation   z =  -1.12 Pr > z = 0.26  
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The coefficient for the lagged budget deficit is significant and relevant for what concerns 
the magnitude. The debt service becomes significant when controlling for endogeneity. 
This means that the quantity of interest paid in the previous period has a positive effect 
on the budget, by reducing the deficit. 
The election dummy is significant in the two estimations and robust to every 
specification. The result is another confirmation of the presence of PBC. The magnitude 
is quite impressive: in the 12 preceding the elections, the budget inflates to 3 times the 
level of non-election years. 
The partisan dummy variable as well is significant: the sign is in line with the results of 
Alesina, Roubini, Cohen (1997) and with partisan models: left-wing parties tend to 
accumulate bigger budget deficits than right-wing parties, whose first priority is usually 
the control of inflation. 
 
The utilization quota has a significant and positive coefficient, once endogeneity is taken 
in account. An increase in total net liabilities (UQ) toward the IMF increases therefore 
the budget deficit, worsening the fiscal situation of the country. This is a strong signal of 
the presence of a moral hazard problem on the side of the government: The presence of 
access to credit exacerbates the willingness to distort the economic cycle. This result is 
extremely interesting, especially for the robustness to a number of specifications. The 
consequence for the fund are quite heavy and do imply the necessity of a lot of care in the 
choice and in the authorization of loans, especially for countries that are already indebted. 
 
  
The change in net credit (NNC) is not giving any further information: infact, even if the 
coefficient is significant, the 95% confidence interval does not exclude that the 
coefficient could be negative. It is therefore quite hazardous to extrapolate information 
from there. 
The test for autocorrelation of order one and two rejects the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation of order one and cannot reject the same null hypothesis for order two, 
which means that the system is well-specified.  
 
  
34
 
Are elections influencing the behavior of IMF? 
 
This part of the analysis is devoted to the investigation of the behavior of the Fund 
toward indebted countries, for what concerns the electoral cycle. The aim is to establish if 
in the 12 month before the elections (or after), the quantity of credit accorded to a country 
is rising or not, therefore whether the IMF is somehow taking of the pre-electoral (or 
post) period or of the political orientation of the government elected, in order to expand 
the amount of credit given. . Recall on this matter that non-concessional credits are 
offered mainly with one-year deals.  
 
The hypothesis to test is the following: Fund’s bureaucrats do have a motivation for 
boosting at all time quantity of credit lent. The motivation would be essentially connected 
with the prestige that follows with being capable of concluding important deals, as 
suggested by Vaubel (1991). Since during pre-electionary period, governments are more 
willing to get involved into bigger expenses, and therefore to borrow more money than 
their actual needs, the test is to check if this whole system is working and if IMF’s 
behavior accommodate pre-electoral exigencies of recipient countries.  
 
The methodology to approach the problem will be the same used for part 2: I first 
perform a pooled-fixed effect regression and then using a one-step GMM regression with 
the Arellano-Bond estimator with White correction for heteroskedasticity. 
The dependent variable is now the new net change in concessional credit received from 
the monetary Fund. From the regression suggested by Dreher and Vaubel (2004), 
monetary growth and GDP per capita have been dropped because not significant. 
 
The first value is the coefficient, the value in parenthesis is the standard deviation , the 
values in squared parenthesis are the 95% confidence interval. 
Coefficients that are significant at the 10% significant level are marked with a star* next 
the standard deviation, while coefficients that are significant at the 5% significant level 
are marked with a double star** 
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 Table 5. New Net Non-Concessional Credit Election influence on IMF 
Explanatory variables (1) Fixed effect (2)Gmm 
 0.50    0.48 
 (0.13)** (0.17)**  Net Change in Credit(t-1) 
 [0.24  0.75] [ 0.15  0.81] 
-7.65e+07    -3.3e+07 
5.09e+07 (3.44e+07) Elections 
[-1.77e+08  2.38e+07] [-1.00e+08    3.46e+07] 
 1.55e+08    1.65e+08    
(7.44e+07)** (6.71e+07)** 
Partisan                                             
(right=1) 
[8.7e+06    3.02e+08]  [3.37e+07    2.97e+08] 
 -1.17e+06 -1.48e+06 
 (0.31e+06)**  (0.63e+06)** Utilization Quota (t-1) 
[-1.79e+06  -0.55e+06] [ -2.7e+06   -0.24 e+06] 
 -2.3 7e+04  -1.85e+04 
 (1.11 e+04)** (0.9 e+04)* Inflation (t-1) 
[-4.56e+04  -0.18e+04]  [-3.8 e+04    9.80e+02] 
 -6.15e+06  -1.96e+06 
 (4.85e+06) (6.13e+06) GDP Growth (t-1) 
 [-1.57e+07     3.41e+06] [-1.40e+07    1.01e+07] 
 0.64e+06  1.56e+06 
(3.39e+06) (2.37e+06) 
Foreign Short-term debt                   
over total foreign debt (t-1) 
 [-6.04 e+06    7.32 e+06] [ -3.09 e+06     6.21 e+06] 
-1.10e+07    -1.36e+07 
(4.19 e+06)** (5.94 e+06)** Current account Balance (t-1) 
 [-1.92e+07    -2.71 e+06]   [-2.53e+07    -1.96 e+06] 
0.0038 -0.0003 
(1.7e-03)** (2 e-03) Debt Service (t-1) 
[3.6e-04   7.3 e-03] [ -4.36 e-03    3.7 e-03] 
 2.96e+07    -1.42e+07    
(7.98e+07)   (6 372 384)  Constant 
 [-1.28e+08    1.87e+08]  [-2.67e+07    -1739860] 
R-squared 0.29    
Arellano-Bond test (order 1) pvalue 0.12  
Arellano-Bond test (order 2) pvalue 0.40  
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The Arellano Bond tests suggest a borderline pattern of autocorrelation of the errors of 
order one and no error autocorrelation of order two, which is sufficiently coherent with 
the hypothesis that is behind this estimator. The autoregressive component of the 
regression is significant and shows a positive and moderately persistent pattern. 
The control variables suggested Dreher and Vaubel (2004) are not explicative, with the 
only exception of the lagged account balance, which is highly significant: the negative 
coefficient means that an improvement in the value of the account balance is associated 
with a lowering of the variation of new credit obtained by IMF: this is perfectly in line 
with the very nature of the Fund, which was born with the mandate of lending to 
countries with account balance problems. 
The behavior of the utilization quota is interesting to take in consideration: the coefficient 
is negative, highly significant and robust to different specifications: since most of the 
countries that compose the dataset exhibited in the past problems of high inflation and 
debt, the negative coefficient could be interpreted as cautiousness from the IMF side in 
the concession of new debt. An increase in the total liabilities as a percentage of the quota 
could somehow the Fund nervous and less willing to underwrite new credit lines. 
The fund in this case is behaving as a regular financing institution, trying to minimize the 
risk of default. 
 
However, the real variables of interest are the political ones: in fact, despite the 
interesting information that is possible to deduce from the partisan variable, election and 
post-election dummy variables are not significant; the variable post-ele was dropped 
because in all model specification the p-value associated with the regression was always 
very high. 
The partisan variable coefficient is remarkably significant and positive: If the party in 
power is right-handed, the net credit will increase of 165 millions of current US dollars. 
In order to better appreciate the magnitude of the fact, the average of the loan for each 
country of the dataset for the period 1975-1997 is of 468 millions of current US dollars. 
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Such a selective behavior regarding the political identity of the recipient country would 
as well explain partly why the coefficient on election dummy variable is not significant: 
the relevant matter would be not to enlarge the credit amount but to sponsor governments 
which display ideological believes closer to the Fund’s vision.  
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VI. Conclusions 
 
 
This research investigates the presence of political business cycles in the economic policy 
instruments and considers the possibility of a reciprocal influence between  the IMF and 
the political incumbents that are seeking reelection. 
 
First, I determine the presence of political business cycle in our dataset, which includes 
16 Latin American Countries.  
Evidence of PBC was found in the fiscal policy variable, but not in the monetary policy 
one. The pre-election dummy variable was found to be positive and significant. The 
result is really robust. 
 
The second part of the question is whether IMF is inducing a problem of Moral Hazard in 
the recipient country before the election. The policymakers in the recipient country are 
obviously interested in having a good economic performance before the elections, in 
order to be reelected. What is to determine is if the presence of IMF credit is helping 
politicians seeking power or not.  
The results are quite interesting: once taken care of the endogeneity of IMF related 
variables, the increase of new credit given to a country from IMF has as a direct 
consequence on the amount of budget deficit, that results to be 3 times bigger than during 
non-election years. 
Access to credit seems to exacerbate the willingness of a government to distort the 
economic cycle for election reasons.  
Another result, in line with the public choice literature, is that countries with left-wing 
parties at the government do tend to have bigger budget deficits that right ones. 
 
The third part of the issue takes the problem dealt in the second part, and reverts the 
causality: the attention now is on whether the proximity to the election is affecting the 
behavior of IMF for what concerns the magnitude of the loans. 
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The most relevant results are the one concerning the behavior of the Utilization Quota 
and the political variables. For what concerns the utilization quota, in fact, the negative 
sign of the coefficient suggest that the IMF takes prudential measures to avoid financial 
risks exactly as any other financial institutions: An increase in the total liabilities due to 
the Fund decrease, in fact, the quantity of new credit given.  
For what concerns the political variables, there is no evidence of exploitation of political 
business cycle from the part of the IMF.  
However there is quite a remarkable effect is the partisan dummy variable coefficient, 
which is positive and suggests that a consistently bigger amount of credit is accorded to 
right-hand party governments. This last result suggests the need of stricter and less 
ambiguous procedures to avoid any political inference from the Fund into recipient 
countries. 
 
Summing up, the presence of Political Business Cycles is quite evident by looking at the 
fiscal policy instrument. Governments therefore have the tendency to manipulate the 
economic cycles to signal their competence. The Presence of Credit given by the IMF 
seems to worsen the situation, exacerbating the amplitude of the cycle. The IMF, 
however do not use the delicate moment of election to place more loans. The motivation 
of personal prestige of the Fund’s bureaucracy does not seem to stand. 
Nevertheless, the disparity of treatment in the disbursement of loans on a partisan basis 
does not seem to follow a strict economic logic.  
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Annex 
 
 
Table 7: General Terms of IMF Financial Assistance 
 Repurchase Terms 
Facility or Policy Charges Obligation 
Schedule 
(Years) 
Expectation1 
Schedule 
(Years) 
Installments 
Stand-by Arrangement Basic rate2 
plus  surcharge3 
3¼–5 2¼–4 Quarterly 
Extended Fund Facility Basic rate2 plus  
surcharge3 
4½–10 4½–7 Semiannual 
Compensatory Financing 
Facility 
Basic rate2 3¼–5 2¼–4 Quarterly 
Emergency Assistance Basic rate2 4 3¼–5 N/A Quarterly 
Supplemental Reserve 
Facility 
Basic rate2 
plus  surcharge5 
2½–3 2–2½ Semiannual 
Poverty Reduction and 
Growth   Facility 
0.5 percent per  annum 5½–10 N/A Semiannual 
Memorandum Items:6 
Service Charge 50 basis points 
Commitment Charge7 25 basis points on committed amounts of up to 100 percent of   quota, 10 basis 
points thereafter 
1 Disbursements made after November 28, 2000—with the exception of disbursements of Emergency 
Assistance and loans from the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility—are expected to be repaid on the 
expectation schedule. A member not in a position to meet an expected payment can request the Executive 
Board to approve an extension to the obligations schedule. 
2 The basic rate charge is linked directly to the SDR interest rate by a coefficient that is fixed each financial 
year. The basic rate of charge therefore fluctuates with the market rate of the SDR, which is calculated on a 
weekly basis. The basic rate of charge is adjusted upward for burden sharing to compensate for the overdue 
charges of other members (see Box II.9 in Pamphlet 45). 
3 The surcharge on high levels of credit outstanding under Stand-by Arrangements (SBA) and the Extended 
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Fund Facility (EFF) is 100 basis points for credit over 200 percent of quota, and 200 basis points for credit 
over 300 percent of quota. This surcharge is designed to discourage large use of IMF resources. 
4 For PRGF-eligible members, the rate of charge may be subsidized to 0.5 percent per annum, subject to the 
availability of subsidy resources. 
5 The surcharge on the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) is 300-500 basis points, with the initial 
surcharge of 300 basis points rising by 50 basis points after one year and each subsequent six months. The 
surcharge increases over time in order to provide an incentive for repurchases ahead of the obligation 
schedule. 
6 These charges do not apply to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility. 
7 Commitment charge does not apply to Compensatory Financing Facility and Emergency Assistance. 
Source: IMF web site : http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/howlend.htm 
 
 
